Abstract
Introduction
This report on the size and performance of defaulted bonds and bank loans presents our annual update and analysis. For in-depth discussions of the supply and demand elements of defaulted and distressed securities, as well as their performance and other attributes, see our annuals reports (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) , Altman (1991 Altman ( , 1993 ; Branch and Ray (1992); Altman & Eberhart (1994) ; Ward & Griepentrog (1993) ; Gilson (1995) ; Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998); Reilly, Wright and Altman (1998) ; and Eberhart, Altman and Aggarwal (1999) . Defaulted bonds and bank loans performed somewhat poorly during 2002, reversing the relatively good performance of the preceding year, but more in line with several of the past recent years. This "asset class" has attracted an increasing amount of new capital, however, as the supply of distressed and defaulted debt securities continued its substantial growth over the past four years. Indeed, the estimated supply of 
Market/Face Value Ratios
We consider the ratio of the aggregate market value to face value of the component securities that comprise our indexes to be an important measure of the defaulted debt markets' current relative health and potential future returns. This ratio has ranged, at year-end for defaulted bonds, from a maximum level of 0.74 in 1987 to a minimum level of 0.15 in 2000 ( Figure 5 ). While the market/face value ratio has varied within a fairly narrow range of 0.30 to 0.55 during a majority of years in our 17-year sample period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , abnormal returns for the Index have resulted in a numbers of 7 market/face value ratio observations well outside of this range. Indeed, the ratio has been 0.25 or below in each of the last five years and ended 2002 at 0.17, down from 0.21 one year earlier. The trend in the market/face value ratios of both defaulted bonds and bank loans can be seen clearly in Figure 7 . Note that the Defaulted Bank Loan Index dropped to its all time low ratio in 2002 to 0.46.
One can conclude that if there is movement in the future in the average price level of both defaulted bonds and bank loans that resemble a regression-to-the-mean, then both indexes should rise. In the interest of full disclosure, we have noted this relationship in the past and have not observed the anticipated significant increase in prices and returns.
We still believe that both indexes are at usually low levels, which bodes well for returns in 2003.
Performance Measurement
The A-NYU Index includes the securities of firms at various stages of reorganization either in bankruptcy or restructuring. We calculate the returns for the Index using data compiled from just after default to the point when the bankrupt firm emerges from Chapter 11, is liquidated, or until the default is "cured" or resolved through an exchange. The securities of distressed restructured companies are also included in the Index. The Index included bond issues of all seniorities, from senior-secured to juniorunsecured debt. A study by Altman and Eberhart (1994) , updated by Standard & Poor's (Brand and Behar, 1998) , measures the performance of defaulted debt from the time of original issuance through default and then to emergence from bankruptcy. These studies conclude that the seniority of the issue is an extremely important determinant of the performance of defaulted securities over specific periods, whether from issuance to 8 emergence or from default to emergence. The A-NYU Index does not include convertible or international company issues, nor does it include distressed, but not defaulted, securities.
Performance of Defaulted Bonds
The In 2002, the market experienced seven months with negative returns, but only one of these negative monthly returns was in excess of 5% (-9.44% in June). The June/July period was a particularly difficult one for most risky securities markets. The S&P 500
Stock Index, which finished with an annual return of -22.08% (assuming reinvestment of dividends) in 2002, was comparatively volatile and experienced seven months with negative returns in excess of 5% (see Figure 10 for a listing of comparative returns for highly volatile (±5%) stock market months).
Defaulted bond securities outperformed the total return on the S&P 500 Stock
Index for the second year in a row. The Defaulted Bond Index was outperformed by the 9 Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Bond Market Index, which returned -1.53%. Tenyear government bonds outperformed all of our risky security indexes posting a positive return of 14.66%.
Sixteen-Year Comparative Performance
Figure 8 
Defaulted Bank Loan Performance
Today's managers of distressed securities are more commonly investing in both distressed bonds and the private debt (particularly bank debt) of defaulting companies.
The observed increasing investment in defaulted private debt has been coincident with the bank loan market's increasing size and liquidity as market makers have devoted considerable resources to bank debt trading.
In 2002, our Bank Loan Index performed relatively well compared to most asset classes, returning 3.03% for the year and closing at 120.5 (December 1995=100 
Diversification: Management Styles and Return Correlations
One strategy that our analysis will suggest is to include defaulted debt in a larger portfolio of risky securities. Several domestic pension funds and foreign portfolios have effectively used this strategy by allocating a portion of their total investments to defaulted debt money managers. The principal idea for this strategy is that the returns from investing in distressed debt securities have relatively low correlations with most other major asset classes. This can be clearly seen from the data on returns that we have been tracking for many years. correlation between defaulted debt and the S&P 500 Stock Index is only 27.59%. The correlation between defaulted bonds and S&P equities is slightly above the correlation between these two asset classes as of last year (24.89%). The low correlation is important to note because holders of defaulted debt usually exchange their debt for the equity of the emerged Chapter 11 entity, unless they sell the debt just prior to emergence.
The correlation between these two asset classes on a quarterly basis is slightly higher at 32.6%.
The correlation between defaulted bonds and high yield bonds, however, is comparatively high. The monthly correlation of returns is 60.16%, while the quarterly correlation between these two asset classes is 58.10%. As was the case in 2001, the correlation between high yield bonds and the Defaulted Loan Index (see Figure 13 ) is lower than that of defaulted bonds and high yield bonds, at 41.77% and 40.18% for monthly and quarterly returns, respectively. The returns for defaulted bank loans have an inverse relationship with the S&P 500 as the correlation is -5.77%. Finally, the monthly returns correlation between our two defaulted debt indexes (bonds and bank loans) was "only" 56.93%. One might expect a somewhat higher correlation.
Diversification by Manager Style
Almost all portfolio managers involved in the distressed market have been specialists in the sector, rather than investors in distressed bonds within broader-based portfolios. Therefore, the avenue of diversification appears to be primarily through the use of different investment managers (there are some rare exceptions where a fund combines investments in more traditional debt and equity securities combined with distressed securities). Some "fund-of-funds" and foreign closed-end Funds have adopted the strategy of selecting managers of distressed securities with different styles. In addition to diversifying across asset classes, these funds have a strategy of investing with managers of distressed securities who practice different approaches (e.g., active, passive, control, long-short, senior vs. subordinate). A partial list of almost 60 distressed debt investors can be found in Appendix D and a listing of three major types of strategies and their sub-strategies is given in Appendix E.
Bank Loan Recovery Analysis
Due to the significant increase in the number of defaulted loan facilities and the attendant interest from investors, there is an increasing number of published studies on recovery rates on defaulted bank loans (e.g., from the rating agencies). Also, with the continued disparity between our Bank Loan Index's market/face value ratio and the typical average experience, we believe that estimating recovery rates on defaulted bank 13 loans using our Index will be interesting. Our analysis of bank loan recoveries contained a sample of 262 defaulted bank loan facilities from 1996 through 2002. The recovery rate is determined by prices or price quotes from the secondary market at or just after default.
We discovered that the median, weighted average and arithmetic average values of defaulted bank loan recovery rates over this period were 70.54%, 69.02%, and 69.22% respectively ( Figure 14 ). The standard error was 19.62%, which somewhat supports a wide dispersion of defaulted bank loan recovery rates, including a number of particularly low rates. We also observed recovery rates by year of default and found that both the In addition, we attempted to determine the extent to which defaulted bank loan recovery rates for telecommunications and e-commerce companies mirrored the experience of defaulted bonds for companies in those sectors, which were considerably lower than those of companies in more traditional sectors. 14 As expected, these results compare favorably (i.e., are higher) with the recovery rates of defaulted bonds. Average loan recoveries in recent years, however, are much below the historical average as reflected in the market/face value ratio. 
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